On
I. Introduction
On December 17, 2004, El Salvador became the fi rst of six signatory countries to ratify the Dominican Republic -Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA ) and on March 1, 2006, it became the fi rst to implement the agreement. DR-CAFTA created a trading block among six Latin American economies (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and the US, the fi rst such agreement since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA ) united Canada , the US and Mexico in 1992 (although the US had certainly continued to negotiate bilateral free trade agreements. Not surprisingly, controversy has surrounded the agreement since its inception, as CAFTA-DR became the newest battle in the ideological war regarding the merits of "free trade."
However, even staunch supporters of trade agreements would likely agree that CAFTA-DR provides questionable advantages for the six Latin American signatories, as they already received most of the CAFTA-DR-related trade benefi ts through the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) with fewer conditions. Meanwhile, the potential benefi ts are questionable, at best, and thus begs the question: Why would any of the six Latin American economies sign on to such an agreement?
Th ere is likely a wide array of economic, political and social motives for which each of the six signatory countries negotiated, signed, and ratifi ed CAFTA -DR. Th is paper seeks to explain the motives of just one of these signatories: El Salvador . Understanding El Salvador's participation in CAFTA-DR is critical not only because its government was the most vociferous supporter of the agreement but because CAFTA-DR demonstrates the consolidation of the country's previously nascent Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC ).
In the following section, I will lay out the potential costs and benefi ts of CAFTA -DR. As will be shown, the costs appear to far outweigh potential benefi ts. In Section III, I seek to solve the puzzle concerning El Salvador 's leadership in negotiating and ratifying CAFTA-DR despite its numerous costs. Section IV presents some alternative arguments, and Section V presents conclusions.
II. Measuring the Benefi ts of CAFTA -DR
Despite rhetoric concerning CAFTA -DR's propensity to bestow new economic opportunities for Central America through free trade, CAFTA-DR provides scarcely any new trade-related benefi ts. Most of the advantages that CAFTA-DR supporters purport to receive were benefi ts Salvadoran producers already received under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the US' Generalized System of Preferences. Under these agreements, 80 percent of Salvadoran goods entered the US duty free (USTR 2005a).
While El Salvador enjoyed no or low-tariff rates for goods entering the US market prior to CAFTA -DR, it was able to maintain a range of tariff s on US products entering the Salvadoran market. Not only does CAFTA-DR weaken El Salvador's tariff position, it reduces them by levels that go signifi cantly further than those prescribed by the World Trade Organization (WTO ). Under WTO guidelines, the average allowed tariff for El Salvador ranges from 41 to 150 percent for import-sensitive products (USTR 2005a), and tariff reductions may be stratifi ed. Th e WTO also permits raising tariff s within the param-
